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THE EMPLOYMENT COURT, "JUDICIAL ACTIVISM," AND
THE COALITION AGREEMENT
JOHN HUGHES*
I. THE BACKGROUND TO THE COALITION AGREEMENT
Introduction
By the time of the 1996 general election in New Zealand, the Employ-
ment Contracts Act 1991 ("the ECA") had been in force for just over five
years. The election result on October 12, 1996, made it clear that the next
government would comprise a coalition between the New Zealand First
Party and either the ruling National Party or the Labour Party (the main op-
position party prior to the election).' On December 11, 1996, New Zealand's
first government under the mixed member proportional representation sys-
tem was established by the Coalition Agreement between the New Zealand
National Party and New Zealand First.
To most political commentators, the partnership was unexpected.
Founded and led by Winston Peters, a former minister in the National Gov-
ernment of 1990 who had left the National Party after a series of bitter in-
ternal disputes, New Zealand First had claimed the "center" as its political
constituency and had reserved its strongest criticism during the election
campaign for the National Government and its neo-liberal economic stance.
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1. Other parties represented in Parliament were the Alliance (13 seats), ACT New Zea-
land (8 seats), and the United Party (one seat). To ensure a majority in the House of Repre-
sentatives for either of the two large parties, National (44 seats) and Labour (37 seats), a coa-
lition with New Zealand First (17 seats) was required. On a spectrum from left to right, the
Alliance was furthest to the left, Labour was on the center left, New Zealand First and the
United Party were avowedly "center parties" per se, National was on the center right, and
ACT New Zealand was furthest to the right. However, much of New Zealand First's rhetoric
attracted support from former Alliance voters. For example, the Party's deputy leader, Tau
Henare, announced shortly before the election campaign began that he would never serve in a
Cabinet where the National Party's Prime Minister and Finance Minister continued to hold
their portfolios (Tau Henare, A Defining Moment, speech to the New Zealand First Annual
Convention, July 20,1996). Mr. Henare is now Minister of Maori Affairs in a Cabinet where
the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance continue in their previous roles.
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Indeed, the party's central advertising theme was that the only way to get rid
of National was to vote for New Zealand First. Naturally, then, the party
was widely perceived as the most likely potential coalition partner for the
Labour Party in a center-left Government. By common consensus among
political analysts, New Zealand First had thereby gathered a significant
share of votes that might otherwise have gone to Labour or--on the political
left of Labour-to the Alliance Party.'
Nevertheless, on one significant issue New Zealand First had differed
from Labour. The Labour Party was committed to repealing the Employ-
ment Contracts Act 1991 (the ECA) and to replacing it with legislation
promoting collective bargaining and enhancing the rights of employees and
unions.' Against this, New Zealand First undertook to retain the ECA but to
amend it "to resolve outstanding issues relating to representation and fair-
ness."4 The most significant of these suggested amendments can be divided
into three areas.' First, in terms of bargaining, it was proposed that the ECA
should be amended to ensure "good faith bargaining" in all contractual ne-
gotiations; to introduce compulsory arbitration in the essential services; to
ensure that employers recognize employees' bargaining agents; and to allow
access for employees' representatives to address employees at their work
site. 6 Second, in terms of personal grievances, it was proposed that amend-
ments should seek to codify existing case law on procedural fairness in
2. For an account of the election campaign, see Stephen Levine & Nigel Roberts, The
1996 General Election, in NEW ZEALAND POLITICS IN TRANSrION ch. 3(4) (Raymond Miller
ed., 1997). Part 3 of this text contains a useful contemporary account of the four major politi-
cal parties. The industrial relations policy of the three main parties (National, Labour, and
Alliance) is set out in a symposium in the EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. 3-9 (1997).
3. NEw ZEALAND LABOUR PARTY, WORKING TOGETHER: LABOUR'S STRATEGY FOR
LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE 1990S (1995).
4. NEw ZEALAND FIRST POLICY RELEASE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 2 (Sept. 26, 1996)
[hereinafter POLICY STATEMENT]. The emphasis on amendment rather than repeal was seem-
ingly designed to enhance New Zealand First's image as a "center party" and separated NZ
First from the other main opposition parties. Clearly, legislation may be repealed yet sub-
stantially re-enacted. This would have been the case with the ECA had Labour been the
dominant partner in a coalition government, given that the ECA's provisions relating to free-
dom of association (Part I), personal grievances (Part III), enforcement (Part IV), strikes and
lockouts (Part V), and institutions (Part VI) were likely to have been re-enacted with few
changes. Indeed, Parts II, IV, and V of the ECA themselves substantially re-enact the rele-
vant provisions in the repealed Labour Relations Act 1987. At the same time, legislation may
be retained yet amended so significantly that its entire nature changes. Arguably, this would
have been the case with the ECA had New Zealand First's proposal for good faith bargaining
survived the coalition negotiations in its apparently intended form.
5. The POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 4, also promised to raise the minimum wage un-
der the Minimum Wage Act 1983 to $7.50 per hour for adult employees (i.e., those over the
age of 20) and to provide graduated increases for those between the age of 12 and 20. The
Coalition Agreement undertook to raise the minimum adult wage to $7.00 per hour and to
review it further in the light of the target set by New Zealand First, together with a review of
"below adult" rates. This was implemented by the Minimum Wage Order 1997 (SR 1997/11).
6. While the ECA provided at the time for recognition, Employment Contracts Act § 12
1991 (N.Z.) [hereinafter ECA], and access, Id. §§ 13-15, the emphasis on amendment sug-
gested that enhanced rights were contemplated. This point is elaborated below.
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grievance cases. Third, it was proposed that all employment-related legisla-
tion should be brought within the general framework of the ECA.
Equally significant, in terms of the eventual shape of the Coalition
Agreement, was what New Zealand First undertook to retain. The party
stated that it would retain the "voluntary unionism" of Part I of the ECA7
and the unlawfulness of strikes relating to multi-employer collective em-
ployment contracts under Part V of the Act.8 New Zealand First also
pledged unequivocally that it would retain the specialist Employment Court9
and boost resources for the Employment Tribunal.'0
The brevity of the New Zealand First policy," coupled with its publica-
tion barely three weeks before the day of the election (thereby precluding
elucidation in debate), 12 made precise comparison with the policies of its
eventual coalition partner, National, difficult. The National Party stated
simply that the ECA was a fundamental of its economic policy and should
not be changed. In this respect, the New Zealand First proposals for "good
faith bargaining" were clearly the most significant point of difference be-
tween National and New Zealand First, since the ECA makes no provision
requiring negotiation of any kind prior to entering into an employment con-
tract, leave alone negotiation in good faith." While no further content was
given to the "good faith bargaining" which NZ First undertook to introduce,
in media appearances by both the leader and deputy leader of the party prior
to the election it was asserted that-at that stage-the intention was to re-
dress a perceived imbalance in bargaining power under the ECA that fa-
vored employers unfairly.
14
This is reinforced by documents emerging from the coalition negotia-
tion process, indicating that some key features of "good faith" bargaining-
such as a duty to meet, to negotiate, and to be timely-were contemplated.'5
The suggested amendment to provide for compulsory arbitration likewise
marked a move away from National's emphasis on a "permissive" bargain-
ing regime. Against this, the remaining aspects of New Zealand First's pol-
icy on bargaining-recognition of bargaining agents and reasonable access
7. PoLIcY STATEMENT, supra note 4, para 1. No other political party was committed to
any other system.
8. Id. para. 5. The Labour Party, and the Alliance, would have allowed strikes over
multi-employer collective contracts.
9. ECA § 103.
10. ECA § 77. For recent consideration of the Court and the Tribunal generally, see
Symposium, The Specialist Institutions, 21 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 1 (1996).
11. The suggested substantive changes to the ECA were described in only 116 words.
12. The policy was made available on September 26, 1996. The election took place on
October 12.
13. This point is developed below.
14. A repeated theme of speeches by Winston Peters, the leader of New Zealand First,
was that the flexibility introduced by the ECA could not survive unless the ECA was seen to
be made more even-handed in its operation. This point was emphasized in televised
"Leaders' Debates" immediately before the general election.
15. See below under examples of perceived activism.
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for employ7ee representatives-simply restated existing obligations within
the ECA.' Seemingly, New Zealand First's proposed investigation of codi-
fication in relation to the principles of procedural fairness and the absorp-
tion of all other employment-related legislation into the ECA were aimed at
providing a convenient reference point rather than altering the law in these
areas.17 The retention of the "freedom of association" provisions in Part I of
the ECA and the law barring strikes concerning multi-employer collective
employment contracts were, again, simply a restatement of the existing po-
sition.
In terms of New Zealand First's pledge to retain the Employment
Court, it might have been thought that the two parties were again in agree-
ment. National, after all, had clearly stated that it did not favor amending
the ECA and that the specialist institutions were an integral part of the leg-
islation. However, it is likely that New Zealand First's undertaking was
prompted by continuous and sharp criticism of the Employment Court, and
particularly its Chief Judge, by government ministers in the National ad-
ministration, and by employer organizations which were otherwise strongly
supportive of the ECA and the National Government's economic direction.
While the National Government had continued to deny that it planned to re-
strict further or to abolish the Employment Court if re-elected," there was
an increasing perception that if the ECA was to be chanfed at all by another
National Government, it would be changed in this area.
Reaching the Coalition Agreement
The lengthy coalition negotiations between New Zealand First and Na-
tional respectively yield little by way of hard evidence as to why particular
aspects of either party's election policy were modified in the eventual Coa-
lition Agreement. One aspect of the coalition-forming process was agree-
ment on the part of all participants that they would not reveal details of the
negotiations either during those negotiations or afterwards. Thus far, this
undertaking has been observed. Yet there is no doubt that, if posed in terms
of an isolated contest between competing ideas about employment under the
16. See Employment Contracts Act §§ 12-15, 1991 (N.Z.).
17. The policy stated that the object was in relation to procedural fairness "to ensure that
all employers and employees have a central legislative reference that outlines their rights and
responsibilities." PoLIcY STATEMENT, supra note 4, para. 2.
18. Acting Minister of Labour, Oral Answer to Parliamentary question, Hansard, June
12, 1996.
19. This perception was heightened by comments made by the Prime Minister in a radio
interview in the closing stages of the election campaign that the ECA might be modified so as
to "tighten it" if the National party went into a coalition partnership with ACT New Zealand.
Of those parties which eventually secured seats in the first MMP Parliament, ACT alone had
appeared to advocate a radical rethinking of the institutional structure established by the
ECA, the Employment Court, and the Employment Tribunal, and envisaged a return to prin-
ciples of common law contract in employment disputes, administered in the ordinary courts.
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ECA, ° the Statement on Industrial Relations in the Coalition Agreement in-
dicates that the National Party negotiators conceded nothing of significance
to New Zealand First." At the same time, National's negotiators gained New
Zealand First's commitment to changes which have the potential to amend
the ECA more radically (and more in favor of employer interest groups)
than National itself had suggested prior to the election and which, arguably,
sits in stark opposition to New Zealand First's commitment to "put in-
creased safeguards into the Act to ensure that workers cannot be exploited
and that their best interests can be maintained.
22
Taking the most radical of New Zealand First's policies, the introduc-
tion of the concept of "good faith bargaining," paragraph 8 of the Statement
on Industrial Relations states that the Coalition Government will
"[i]ntroduce the concept of 'fair' bargaining into the Employment Contracts
Act, by describing areas where compliance is necessary to abide by princi-
ples underlying the Act (e.g., the obligation to respect the choice of bar-
gaining agent and not to undermine the bargaining process by bypassing the
agent)., 3 In short, contrary to the promise in New Zealand First's policy,
apparently the ECA will not be substantively amended to introduce any
form of good faith bargaining properly so called.24 Instead, "fair bargaining"
will be represented by statutory amendment to incorporate the existing in-
terpretation given to the relevant provisions in the ECA. (This will result, of
course, in no change to the legal principles applicable prior to the general
election, which New Zealand First had criticized as being unfairly biased in
the employer's favor.)
The intended result is to emphasize the absence of control on bargain-
ing behavior that is the essence of the existing legislation. As the Minister
of Finance recently stated:
The Coalition Agreement states that the Government will introduce the
concept of "fair" bargaining to more clearly outline the responsibilities of
parties under the ECA. This may include clarifying the obligations to rec-
ognise and not to bypass an authorised agent. The basic principles of the
ECA will remain.... I want to emphasize that this is not "good faith bar-
gaining," North American style. We remain committed to a permissive
framework for industrial relations, the opposite of the North American
system, which prescribes when people must meet to bargain and what they
20. Against this, it is clearly possible that policy in one area might have been traded off
against policy in a different area altogether.
21. The Coalition Agreement of December 11, 1996, consisted of a First Part setting out
the principles underlying the Coalition, and its management, and a Second Part consisting of
two schedules. Schedule A contains detailed statements of agreement in policy areas, of
which Industrial Relations is one. Schedule B outlines agreed fiscal parameters. The State-
ment on Industrial Relations in Schedule A is summarized in Gordon Anderson, The Coali-
tion Government's Policy on Industrial Relations, 1997 EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. 28.
[hereinafter Statement on Industrial Relations].
22. PoLICY STATEMENT, supra note 4.
23. Statement on Industrial Relations, supra note 21.
24. This point is elaborated below.
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have to bargain, and a host of other controls on bargaining behavior. The
last six years have taught us that such control is not necessary."
Similarly, the implied promise of increased powers of access for bar-
gaining representatives is diluted into a pledge to incorporate the relevant
case law principles under the existing provisions into the Act, again result-
ing in no effective change.26 Against this, the relatively simple proposal by
New Zealand First to investigate the feasibility of codifying the require-
ments of procedural fairness in personal grievance cases and its pledge to
retain the Employment Court are converted into a two-fold initiative in
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Statement, which promise
... [an] immediate review [of] whether, and how, decisions of the Em-
ployment Court and the Court of Appeal with respect to personal griev-
ance and procedural matters under the Act can be codified into legisla-
tion. . ... In [the] meantime, [to] retain the separate jurisdiction of the
Employment Court but conduct a formal study of the Court's decisions to
establish whether Parliament's intentions have been clearly expressed for
the purposes of minimising judicial activism in the employment area.
The italicized phrase implied, for the first time since 1990, that the fu-
ture of the specialist Court was now insecure. A further promise, in para-
graph 6 of the Statement, to boost the resources of the Employment Tribunal
and the Employment Court if, following a review, it is found that justice is
being denied because of delays, reflects New Zealand First policy. It cannot
be reconciled with the apparently insecure status of the Employment Court
(unless it is viewed as a temporary or transitional measure, should the Court
be removed).
A variety of explanations have been offered for this apparent policy
rout. The most frequently expressed explanation (from New Zealand First's
political opponents) is that the party was simply duplicitous and never in-
tended to fulfill its promises. 9 An alternative view is that New Zealand
First's industrial relations policy was not central to its election campaign,"
that it had been hastily formulated without expert assistance," and that-in
25. Minister of Finance W.F. ("Bill") Birch, Speech to the Wellington District Law So-
ciety (June 7, 1997).
26. See below under The Duty to Recognize Bargaining Representatives.
27. Paragraph 10 of the Statement on Industrial Relations, supra note 21, extends this
investigation of codification to the principles surrounding fixed-term contracts.
28. Statement on Industrial Relations, supra note 21 (emphasis added).
29. Labour Party Spokesperson Steve Maharey, What's MMP Got to Do With It?,
Speech Before the Labour-Management-Government Relations Seminar (March 20, 1997).
30. The party had campaigned primarily on issues arising from "overseas control" of
New Zealand, the state-funded education and health systems, and Maori grievances. See
Raymond Miller, The New Zealand First Party, in NEW ZEALAND PoLmcs IN TRANSMON,
supra note 2, ch. 4(3).
31. The origins of the policy are obscure, although the deputy leader of New Zealand
First, Mr. Tau Henare (who released it and acted as spokesperson on industrial relations dur-
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1 [1997], rt. 13
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol28/iss1/13
1997] COALMON AGREEMENT 173
so far as it parted company with National's ideas while endorsing the reten-
tion of the ECA-it was therefore vulnerable to change when the New Zea-
land First negotiators met with the more experienced negotiators for the
National Party. The National Party's negotiating team included Mr. Max
Bradford, a former chief executive of the New Zealand Employers' Federa-
tion, who, as a National Party Member of Parliament, had chaired the select
committee dealing with the Employment Contracts Bill and a later select
committee inquiring into the effects of the ECA 2
A third, and possibly crucial, player then entered the scene. To cope
with the perceived imbalance in experience and access to information be-
tween the teams involved in the coalition negotiation process, the Public
Service was placed at their disposal during the negotiations. The implica-
tions of proposals put forward during those negotiations were to be dealt
with by the supply of "answers" from the Public Service to questions from
those teams. A series of such answers addressed the central tenets of New
Zealand First's policy when framed as questions.33 The authorship of the pa-
pers in terms of the relevant Government Department is not clear, but prime
responsibility for labor market analysis lies with the Department of Labour,
which must have played a major-if not exclusive-role in preparing much
of the relevant information and analysis.3 While the release of the docu-
ments under the name of the State Service Commission35 was accompanied
by the qualification that "the information and analysis provided was sup-
plied in response to written questions on specific matters," and that "[the]
ing the election campaign) was at one time a union official. The party's current industrial re-
lations spokesperson, Peter Brown, is a former shipping consultant.
32. He is widely regarded as being among the strongest advocates of the neo-liberal eco-
nomic stance of the then Government-in colloquial terms, he is "dry" rather than "wet." Mr.
Bradford's place on the negotiating team was said to have been at the insistence of the Na-
tional party caucus, which wanted a "dry" representative to counter any drift towards radical
amendment of the key planks of Government policy, including the ECA, in the face of New
Zealand First's apparent desire to shift to a more evenly weighted environment. For the coa-
lition formation process, see Jonathon Boston, Coalition Formation, in NEW ZEALAND
POLITIcS IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, ch. 5(2).
33. The replies to requests for information are published without consecutive page num-
bering in STATE SERVICES COMMISSION, INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE IN
RESPONSE TO REQUESTS MADE BY POLITICAL PARTIES TAKING PART IN COALITION FORMATION
TALKS (1997) [hereinafter RESPONSE TO REQUESTS]. Consistent with the secrecy surrounding
the coalition building exercise, the papers do not indicate the source of the request for infor-
mation (i.e., whether the National party, the Labour Party, or New Zealand First). The papers
selected for this Article are primarily those answering questions which are clearly related to
the themes in New Zealand First's election policy. Some of these issues overlap with propos-
als made by the Labour Party.
34. The other Government department which commonly offers analysis of labor market
issues, the New Zealand Treasury, has disclaimed any involvement. See "No Agenda" says
Labour Department, PUB. SERVICE ASS'N J., May 27, 1997, at 1, and related correspondence,
id. at5.
35. The State Services Commission is a department of State with overall responsibility
for the administration of the Public Service. The powers and functions of the chief executive
of the Commission are set out in Part I of the State Sector Act of 1988.
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documents do not contain policy advice," 6 it is obvious that the way in
which information is selected and presented can in itself be persuasive
without the addition of overt recommendations.37
It will be argued below that the defining characteristic of the Public
Service advice offered to the coalition negotiating teams on labor market
issues was its adherence to the National Government's line of thinking on
the desirability of retaining the fundamental elements of the ECA, cou-
pled-where reform was mooted-with an identifiable reliance on criti-
cisms of the ECA made by the two major employer pressure groups, the
New Zealand Employers' Federation and the New Zealand Business
Roundtable." The replies to requests for information were typified by an
overall hostility to proposed changes to the ECA, particularly where the
changes might lead to further development of legal principles by the
courts.39 A notable feature of the replies was the tendency in key areas to de-
scribe critical accounts of the ECA in terms of unfairness or exploitation as
being "anecdotal" or "perceptions" only, while presenting the controverted
"successes" of the ECA-and the dangers presented by any amendment-as
36. RESPONSE TO REQUESTS, supra note 33, at i. All answers to questions given in the
context of coalition negotiations were provided by the State Services Commissioner on be-
half of the Public Service. Under guidelines produced by the State Services Commissioner,
departments were not permitted to offer advice, but were allowed to provide information and
analysis. See STATE SERVICES COMMISSIONER, NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTIES TO
FORM A GOVERNMENT; GUIDELINES ON SUPPORT FROM THE PUBLIC SERVICE (Oct. 21, 1996);
STATE SERVICES COMMISSION, WORKING UNDER PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTAnTON 7 (1995).
37. The constitutional ramifications of this situation have yet to be fully explored. Since
the enactment of the State Sector Act 1988, arguably New Zealand has moved away from the
Westminster model of a politically neutral public service (with Ministers having a role in the
selection of chief executives of Government departments) and Public Service "advice" to
ministers has increasingly reflected back to the Government its own policy preferences.
However, in the context of information supplied during coalition negotiations, it seems
strongly arguable that a strictly balanced approach was called for and that the Public Service,
which had a contemporaneous role in serving the "caretaker Government," should have been
meticulous to avoid seemingly partisan advice. On the change in role of the Public Service,
see RESHAPING THE STATE, NEW ZEALAND'S BUREAUCRATIC REVOLUTION (Johnathon Boston
et al. eds., 1996); PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: THE NEW ZEALAND MODEL (Johnathon Boston et al.
eds., 1996); JANE KELSEY, ROLLING BACK THE STATE: PRIVATISATION OF POWER IN
AOTEAROA/NW ZEALAND ch. 4 (1993); JANE KELSEY, THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIMENT: A
WORLD FOR STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT? ch. 3 (1995); BRIAN EASTON, THE COMMER-
CIALISATION OF NEW ZEALAND (1997). On the role of the Public Service during the coalition
process, see John Martin, Advisers and Bureaucrats, in NEW ZEALAND POLITICS IN TRAN-
SmON, supra note 2, ch. 6(2). Martin makes the cogent suggestion that an inter-party proto-
col is required on the modalities of the provision of technical information and support by the
Public Service, id. at 114.
38. For the role of these groups in setting the political agenda and influencing Govern-
ment policy, see Brian Roper, A Level Playing Field? Business Political Activism and State
Policy Formation, in STATE AND ECONOMY IN NEW ZEALAND ch. 8 (Brian Roper & Chris
Rudd eds., 1993); John Deeks, Business and Politics, in NEW ZEALAND POLITICS IN TRAN-
smoN, supra note 2, ch. 4(8); JANE KELSEY, ROLLING BACK THE STATE, supra note 37, ch 8.
39. This point is developed below under Examples of Perceived Activism.
40. Noting also that the extent of such perceptions could not be measured because of a
lack of "reliable data." Request No. 508/1, in RESPONSE TO REQUEST, supra note 33.
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being facts.4 ' The underlying assumptions informing this analysis were out-
lined in a key passage from the "Executive Overview" of the Public Service,
which stated the following:
Under current labour market regulation, the emphasis is placed on the
encouragement of competitive behaviour and choice, flexibility, and re-
sponsiveness in bargaining processes and outcomes in order that the par-
ticular needs of the parties are met in the most efficient way. This en-
hances firm-level productivity, income generation and employment.
New Zealand firms and employees are still adjusting to the opportuni-
ties and threats from increasing international competition. The current
regulatory policy settings in the economy and labour market have acted to
facilitate and reduce the cost of this adjustment, contributing to a substan-
tial growth in jobs and fall in unemployment.
The Employment Contracts Act liberalized bargaining processes and
options and has contributed to adjustment processes over a period of sus-
tained economic and employment growth. Amending the Employment
Contracts Act to reintroduce procedures incurring significant transaction
costs or constraining outcomes should only be considered if the identifi-
able benefits from doing so are sufficient to offset these costs.41
We can now turn to a more detailed examination of those aspects of the
Coalition Agreement already outlined. In terms of the implementation of the
Agreement, Mr. Bradford is now the Minister of Labour in the Coalition
Government. Significantly, New Zealand First has no Associate Minister of
Labour.4 '3 As of July 1997, the review of Employment Court decisions out-
lined in the Coalition Agreement is under way and legislation based on that
review, amending the ECA, is planned for the first or second quarter of
1998.44
2. Questioning the Employment Court: The Impetus for Change
When the Employment Contracts Bill was proceeding through Parlia-
ment in 1991, a paper setting out four possible options was sent to the 800-
odd people and organizations who had made submissions on the bill. The
options presented were, first, the retention of the existing Mediation Service
and Labour Court; second, the creation of a specialist tribunal with appeal
rights to the High Court; third, a specialist tribunal with appeal rights to a
41. In particular, this occurred in the Executive Overview presented in answer to Re-
quests No. 519 and No. 508/5, in RESPONSE TO REQUEST, supra note 33, which responded to
the question, "Are there any changes to the ECA that would help to increase sustainable rates
of economic growth and/or improve labour market performance?"
42. Request No. 519, supra note 41.
43. When approached to comment on Mr. Bradford's industrial relations proposals, Mr.
Peter Brown, New Zealand First's spokesperson on industrial relations, stated that he was
"not up to speed with what Mr. Bradford was working on." Ruth Largeson, Bid to Toughen
Employment Contracts Act, SUNDAY STAR TIMES, March 23, 1997, at A2.
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specialist court; and, fourth, for employment matters to be dealt with by the
ordinary courts.5 Prior to this, two opposing schools of thought on the then-
specialist Labour Court had been presented to the Government by depart-
ments of the Public Service. The New Zealand Treasury strongly favored
the abolition of the specialist court and advocated a return to the ordinary
principles of contract in employment cases. In this, the Treasury had the
support of the two most influential employer groups, the New Zealand Em-
ployers' Federation and the New Zealand Business Roundtable. Against
this, the Department of Labour and the State Services Commission, the two
departments with the most immediate responsibility for industrial relations,
had favored the retention of a specialist jurisdiction. This approach was
supported by the overwhelming majority of submissions to the select com-
mittee considering the Employment Contracts Bill, including those from
unions and-for the most part-from the legal profession. At this stage, the
policy debate was won by those favoring the retention of the specialist in-
stitutions.46
While the Employers' Federation and the Business Roundtable had
welcomed the permissive bargaining framework imposed by the Employ-
,ment Contracts Act 1991, their combined assault on what had by then be-
come the Employment Court47 continued unabated in a steady stream of
published papers, media releases, and conferences dedicated to the subject.
At first, the Government's response was supportive of the Court. In 1993,
following the joint publication of a purportedly topical report by the em-
ployer groups criticizing the Labour Court and the EmploX0ment Court,49 Bill
Birch, then Minister of Employment stated the following:
The exchange of labour is not simply subject to the same contractual ar-
rangements as financial and product market exchanges. Employment law
is now concerned with the legal requirements of the balance between the
legislation's intentions of catering for society's requirements of fairness,
and enabling the building of positive longer term employment relation-
45. See Pat Walsh & Rose Ryan, The Making of the Employment Contracts Act, in
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACrS: NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCES ch. 4 (Raymond Harbridge ed.,
1993); Rose Ryan & Pat Walsh, Common Law vs. Labour Law; the New Zealand Debate,
6(3) AusTL. J. LAB. L. 230 (1993).
46. Id.
47. This was previously the Labour Court.
48. The main publications were: NEW ZEALAND BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE & NEW
ZEALAND EMPLOYERS' FEDERATION, A STUDY OF THE LABouR/EMPOYMENT COURT (1992)
[hereinafter LABOUR/EMPLOYMENT COURT]; COLIN HOWARD, INTERPRETATION OF THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACrS AcT 1991 (1995); BERNARD ROBERTSON, THE STATUS AND JU-
RISDICTION OF THE NEW ZEALAND EMPLOYMENT COURT (1996); CHARLES W. BAIRD, THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRAcTs ACT AND UNJUSTIFIABLE DISMISSAL (1996).
49. But in reality mainly dealing with the Labour Court and its predecessors. See
LABOUR/EMPLOYMENT COURT, supra note 48.
50. Rt. Hon. Bill Birch, Address at the New Zealand Institute of Industrial Relations Re-
search Conference on Employment Law: Present Developments and Future Issues (October 8,
1993).
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ships.... Subsequently [sic], the institutions play an important role in the
scheme of ... employment relations in New Zealand. Their duty and re-
sponsibilities are clearly written in [the] statute .... The major objectives
of the Government in determining the best formula for the institutions
were carefully thought through. The Employment Tribunal and Employ-
ment Court are better placed to recognize practical solutions which assist
compromise and adjustment. In turn this contributed to certainty of out-
comes and longer stability. In contrast, common law as it stands, does not
adequately reflect the need for compromise and labour market adjustment.
Neither does it fully reflect the human dimension in labour contracting.
The Government still believes that the Employment Tribunal and Court
have a valuable role to play in maintaining this balance."'
At the same time Mr. Bradford, the current Minister of Labour and then
chairperson of the Labour Select Committee, commented that the reasons
for establishing the specialist institutions were still valid, that "the Em-
ployment Tribunal would be difficult to replace as a low level disputes
resolution body," that "the Employment Court has also played a useful role
in interpreting the new legislation," and that moving from specialist institu-
tions to the ordinary courts would not eliminate criticism of some bands of
judicial decision-making. 2
Thus, in 1993, both Mr. Birch and Mr. Bradford emphasized the well-
established justifications for specialist institutions in terms of the special
characteristics of employment contracts, and the need for expertise, ease of
access, and speedy and informal processes and outcomes. 3 Both had also
expressed qualified satisfaction that the Employment Court was performing
as the Government had intended it would in terms of the aims of the ECA. 
4
As we have just seen, four years later, both were equivocal on the need to
retain the Court. What, then, had changed in those four years? A number of
factors might be seen to have combined to breathe new life into the issue:
1. The 1993 statements were made immediately before a general elec-
51. Id.
52. Max Bradford MP, The Future of the Employment Court and Tribunal: The Gov-
ernment View, Address at the New Zealand Institute of Industrial Relations Research Semi-
nar on The Future of the Employment Court and the Employment Tribunal (Apr. 23, 1993).
53. See, e.g., JUSTICE, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS: A REPORT BY JUSTICE (1987). In the New
Zealand context, see, for example, Gordon Anderson, A Specialist Labour Law Jurisdiction?
An Assessment of the Business Roundtable's Attack on the Employment Court, GAMMA
OCCASIONAL PAPER 5 (1993); Gordon Anderson, Specialist Employment Law and Specialist
Institutions, Paper presented to the New Zealand Institute of Industrial Relations Research
Seminar on the Future of the Employment Court and the Employment Tribunal (Apr. 23,
1993); Nick Wailes, The Case Against Specialist Jurisdiction for Labour Law: The Philo-
sophical Assumptions of a Common Law for Labour Relations, 19 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 1
(1994). At the same time, the Attorney-General, The Rt. Hon. Paul East, had suggested that
the Employment Court should become a division of the District Court. See Steve Marshall,
The Future Structure and Operation of the Employment Court and Tribunal, Speech at the
New Zealand Institute of Industrial Relations Research Seminar on "[tihe Future of the Em-
ployment Court and the Employment Tribunal" (Apr. 23, 1993).
54. Mr. Bradford's view was tempered by his concerns that the continuing requirements
of procedural fairness in dismissal cases might be interpreted in a "dogmatic way."
1997]
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tion, at a time when the ECA was still attracting controversy and was widely
unpopular. 55 Among those who opposed the ECA's emphasis on untram-
melled "freedom of choice" in bargaining, the Employment Court's limited
but exclusive jurisdiction was regarded as the last hope for redressing some
adverse consequences of power imbalances between employers and em-
ployees. By 1997, the next election was more than two years away and the
ECA was perceived to be less controversial, both in terms of the parlia-
mentary representation of those parties which had criticized it most vigor-
ously 6 and of opinion surveys. 7 In short, questioning the continuing useful-
ness of the Court was not so electorally perilous.
2. The Public Service, and the restructured Department of Labour" in
particular, was now reflecting back to the Coalition Government unqualified
support for the principles underlying the ECA, coupled with criticisms of
the Employment Court from employer groups, while not reflecting criti-
cisms of the ECA, and support for the Court, from other perspectives.
3. The employer pressure groups had become far more influential in
policy terms 6° as well as increasingly strident in their demands that the role
of the Employment Court be re-examined. Conversely, unions and other
representatives of workers had become significantly weakened in terms both
of political influence and of their resources to challenge what had become in
effect an elite consensus between employer groups, influential policy-
advisers in the Public Service (in particular the Department of Labour and
the New Zealand Treasury), the Government, and significant parts of the
news media.1
55. For analyses of early surveys of opinion under the ECA, see Richard Whatnan et al.,
Labour Market Adjustment Under the Employment Contracts Act, 19 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 53,
69 (1994); Kevin Hince & Raymond Harbridge, The Employment Contracts Act: An Interim
Assessment, 19 N.Z. J. INDus. REL. 235, 251 (1994).
56. See supra note 1, for the respective representation of the Labour Party and the Alli-
ance Party. Against this, when New Zealand First's original proposals for significant change
to the ECA are taken into account, almost 56 percent of the votes in the 1996 general election
went to parties committed to changing the ECA to redress the perceived unfair imbalance in
favor of employers (Labour 31.1%, NZ First 13.5%, and Alliance 11.3%). Id.
57. See Barbara Burton, A Report on Recent MRL and NZIER Research, 1996 EM-
PLOYMENT L. BULL. 24; cf Raymond Harbridge, The Employment Contracts Act a "Hit"-
Really?, 1996 EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. 26 (questioning the reliability of these surveys).
58. The Labour Market Policy Group of the Department of Labor provides the Govern-
ment with strategic policy advice on all aspects of the labor market. The Industrial Relations
Service, also within the Department of Labour, provides advice on the industrial relations
regulatory framework and system. The current organization of the Department of Labour was
established following a review of the Department in 1988.
59. This point is elaborated below under 3. The Possible Outcomes.
60. See supra note 38. The New Zealand Employers' Federation was reported as having
spent M$1.3 on an advertising campaign supporting the ECA in the run-up to the 1996 gen-
eral election, urging electors not to vote to change the Act (as was then advocated by the
three opposition parties, including New Zealand First). To put this sum in perspective, it con-
siderably exceeded the officially declared election expenditure of the main opposition party,
the Labour Party.
61. See Jane Scott, Neo-liberalism at Work: Media-Politics and the Employment Con-
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4. In terms of the permissive bargaining structure which represents the
core of the ECA, as of 1993 the Employment Court had issued a number of
decisions which had enhanced the power of employers and hastened the
Government's intended breakdown of working conditions achieved under
the award system by, for example, enabling employers to by-pass bargain-
ing representatives and negotiate directly with employees,62 and to impose
partial lockouts to achieve their ends.63 In contrast, by 1997, as well as re-
versing these lines of authority6' to some extent, the Employment Court had
begun to interpret the ECA to restrict the power of employers to communi-
cate directly with represented employees during negotiations, an issue of
concern to the Government and to employers.6 The Court had also retained
an approach to personal grievance determination (especially in relation to
fixed-term contracts) which the Government and employers argued not to be
66
appropriate under the ECA's bargaining structure.
5. As compared with 1993, the Employment Court in 1997 had sus-
tained an increasing number of successful appeals (although the proportion
of successful appeals between the two sets of figures remained almost iden-
tical). While in 1993 Mr. Birch felt able to support the Employment Court
by pointing to only nine ECA-related appeals to the Court of Appeal in the
previous two years, of which five had been allowed as an indication that
there was no significant problem,67 by 1997 Mr. Bradford was citing fifty-
three appeals in the previous three years, of which twenty-six had been al-
lowed, as an indication that the Employment Court was not looking to the
law as expressed by Parliament.6
6. As a consequence, the Employment Court was portrayed as being-
at best-unduly activist and-at worst-incompetent. The argument that the
ordinary courts could act as a substitute for the Employment Court was seen
also to be enhanced, since the generalist Court of Appeal was increasingly
seen to be "making the rules." 69
tracts Act (1995) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Auckland) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Auckland Library).
62. Adams v. Alliance Textiles Ltd [19921 1 E.R.N.Z. 982.
63. Paul v. IHC Inc. [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 65.
64. For discussion of the case law developments, see MAZENGARB'S EMPLOYMENT LAW
IT 12.10, 62.8 (Gordon Anderson et al. eds., 5th ed. 1992).
65. Id., T 12.10-.14.
66. See the materials listed at supra note 48.
67. Minister of Labour W.F. ("Bill") Birch, Address to the New Zealand Institute of In-
dustrial Relations Research Conference on Employment Law, Present Developments and
Future Issues (Oct. 8, 1993).
68. Campbell, supra note 44. It should be noted also that a number of the decisions in
this period relate to legislation other than the ECA, in particular the Holidays Act 1981,
which is widely regarded to be poorly drafted, and that many relate to relatively minor proce-
dural points under the ECA. The major decisions are dealt with below. See John Hughes,
Hunting the Snark: Open Legislative Drafting and "Judicial Activism." EMPLOYMENT L.
BULL. 118 (1997).
69. Birch, supra note 25.
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7. The original justification of the Employment Tribunal and Employ-
ment Court as providing one aspect of an easy, speedy, and informal resolu-
tion to disputes was seen to be clouded by increased legalism and formality,
and lengthy waiting lists for fixtures, particularly in the area of personal
grievances.
8. In addition to these factors, the potential changes to the ECA, in-
cluding reconsideration of the Court's jurisdiction (and perhaps existence),
were explained in terms of the need to retain the perceived competitive ad-
vantage, which was claimed to result from the deregulation of the New
Zealand labor market. This advantage was seen to have been eroded by
similar developments in competing countries while being impeded by re-
maining "inflexibilities" within the industrial relations system to which the
Court was allegedly contributing.7'
The Perceived "Activism" of the Court Under the ECA
The criticisms of the Employment Court spring essentially from two
related sources. First, in terms of the conventional neo-liberal economic
analysis, employment contracts are said to be no different from any other
contract and, as a consequence, to require no different treatment from that
afforded to other contracts. Where legislation-including the ECA-
recognizes such a distinction (as, for example, in providing discrete reme-
dies for unjustifiable termination), it is condemned under this analysis.73
Where, on the other hand, the ECA appears to incorporate ordinary con-
tractual concepts, particular criticism has been directed at judgments of the
Employment Court which modify the impact of those concepts by incorpo-
rating a particular approach based on distinctions between contracts of em-
ployment and other types of contract. Such judgments of the Court have
been said to be at odds with the new "contractualism" of the ECA, particu-
larly in relation to bargaining and personal grievances, and this alleged
70. Id. See also Max Bradford, Address to the Labour-Management-Government Rela-
tions Seminar (Mar. 20, 1997); and Max Bradford, Address to the 1997 Government to Busi-
ness Summit (Apr. 3, 1997). There is a paradox here, in that the Government had earlier
hailed the extension of the personal grievance jurisdiction to all employees as a positive fea-
ture of the ECA in comparison to its predecessor, and these clouding features were undoubt-
edly in large measure the result of that extension. See, e.g., Max Bradford, The Employment
Contracts in Operation: A Government View, Speech to the Victoria University of Welling-
ton Industrial Relations Seminar (May 15, 1992); Minister of Labour Doug Kidd, Maharey
Misunderstands Operation of Employment Contracts Act, Press Release (July 3, 1996).
71. Birch, supra note 25; Bradford, Labor Management-Government Relations Seminar,
supra note 70.
72. In the New Zealand context, see PENELOPE BROOK, FREEDOM AT WORK: THE CASE
FOR REFORMING LABOUR IN NEW ZEALAND (1990), a book heavily dependent on the analysis
of Richard Epstein.
73. Penelope Brook-Cowen, Labour Relations Reform in New Zealand: The Employ-
ment Contracts Act and Contractual Freedom XIV J. LAB. RES. 69 (1993).
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1 [1997], Art. 13
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol28/iss1/13
COALITION AGREEMENT
"judicial activism" is argued to be subverting the intention of Parliament.74
Both "judicial activism" and the "intention of Parliament" are notori-
ously slippery concepts, particularly in the hands of pressure groups and
politicians. While judicial activism is not susceptible to formal standards
of measurement, in the hands of critics of the Employment Court it has
loosely embraced extensions of the employer's duties through development
of implied terms at common law beyond the "black letter" contract, 6 and
expansive-rather than restrictive-interpretation of certain provisions of
the ECA (particularly those relating to bargaining and personal griev-
ances). 7 7
In contrast, there are formal means of ascertaining the intention of Par-
liament, which will be examined shortly in the context of the main examples
of alleged activism by the Court. These do not include resort to opinions ex-
pressed by members of the Government, except in rare cases. 71 This is per-
haps as well. The published views of key members of the Government after
the inception of the ECA display some startling inconsistencies in terms of
alleged intention in key areas of labor relations policy, often overlapping
with areas of supposed judicial "activism" on the part of the Employment
Court. For example, section 12(2) of the ECA requires employers to
"recognise" an employee's representative." In one of its earliest decisions,
the Employment Court held that such recognition did not preclude attempts
by the employer to negotiate directly with the employee involved, thereby
by-passing the representative."0 When this decision, among others, precipi-
tated a complaint to the International Labour Organisation under ILO Con-
ventions 87 and 98, the Government supported the Employment Court's ap-
proach as indicating an intended "robust" aspect of the bargaining process
under the ECA.8' When-in an election year-the ILO had reported back
unfavorably, without taking account of a then recently delivered Court of
74. Birch, supra note 25. See supra note 48, for publications which also adopt this ap-
proach.
75. There is an excellent analysis in the New Zealand context in Wendy Davis, Judges
and the Politics of Employment Law (1994) (unpublished L.L.M. Research Paper) (on file
with the Victoria University of Wellington Law Library).
76. See supra note 48, in particular Howard and Robertson.
77. Id. See also Birch, supra note 25.
78. Use of extrinsic materials in interpreting legislation is still comparatively rare, al-
though there is increasing resort to Parliamentary history. JOHN BURROWS, STATUTE LAW IN
NEW ZEALAND ch. 9 (1992).
79. Employment Contracts Act § 12(2), 1991 (N.Z.).
80. Adams v. Alliance Textiles Ltd. [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 982.
81. NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT, RESPONSE TO THE NZCTU COMPLAINT TO THE ILO 46
(1994). For studies of the ILO Complaint, see Nigel Howarth & Stephen Hughes, Under
Scrutiny: The ECA, the ILO and the NZCTU Complaint 1993-1995, 20 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL.
143 (1995); and Tonia Novitz, New Zealand Industrial Relations and the International La-
bour Organisation: Resolving Contradictions Implicit in Freedom of Association, 21 N.Z. J.
INDUS. REL. 119 (1996).
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Appeal decision overriding the Employment Court's approach,82 the Gov-
ernment then criticized the ILO as being ignorant of the intention of the
legislation in this respect, now citing the Court of Appeal's conflicting view
as representing that intention. 3 Similarly, when the Employment Court held
that the ECA enabled employers lawfully to impose a "partial" lockout
(whereby employers were able unilaterally to vary employment contracts to
fit a proposed form of contract under offer, while requiring employees to
work), the then Minister of Labour, Mr. Birch, stated that this was an in-
tended counterpart of the employee's right to strike lawfully by partial
85 86withdrawal of labor. When the Court subsequently reversed its approach,
the chairperson of the Labour Select Committee (and current Minister of
Labour) Mr. Bradford denied that it had ever been the Government's inten-
tion to allow partial lockouts.r Given that Mr. Birch and Mr. Bradford were
key figures in the drafting of the ECA and its subsequent passage through
Parliament, perhaps the courts might be allowed some room for uncertainty.
Examples of Perceived "Activism" Viewed in the Context of Statutory
Interpretation of "Intention"
To understand the criticisms of the Employment Court which lie behind
some aspects of the Coalition Agreement, three areas of contention under
the ECA will be examined by way of example-the decisions on recogni-
tion of representatives, procedural fairness in personal grievances, and the
principles relating to fixed-term contracts. These areas have been selected
since they predominate in criticism of the Court by employer groups and in-
fluential members of the Government." In each case, the method adopted
will be to outline the statutory provision, to examine what formal indicators
exist to the ascertainment of Parliament's intention, to summarize briefly
the approach taken by the Employment Court and the Court of Appeal, and
then to consider the coalition-building process and, in particular, the an-
swers provided by the Public Service to questions posed by the negotiating
teams.
82. Eketone v. Alliance Textiles N.Z. Ltd. [1993] 2 E.R.N.Z. 783.
83. Minister of Labour Doug Kidd, Press Release (Mar. 1994).
84. See Paul v. LH.C. Inc. [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 65, by virtue of section 62(1)(c) of the
ECA, which enables employers to break some or all of their contracts in order to compel em-
ployees to comply with their demands.
85. W.F. ("Bill") Birch, The Employment Contracts Act, THE PRESS, June 22, 1992, at 9
& July 1, 1992, at 9.
86. Witehira v. Presbyterian Support Services Northern [1994] 1 E.R.N.Z. 578.
87. Radio interview by Radio New Zealand with Max Bradford, Morning Report (June
21, 1994).
88. See Birch and Bradford, supra note 67. Other examples include the Employment
Court's interpretation of its jurisdiction over actions "founded on" an employment contract
under section 3 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 and-outside the ECA-
interpretation of the Holidays Act 1981.
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The Duty to Recognize Bargaining Representatives
Section 9 of the ECA states that the object of the bargaining provisions
in Part II of the Act is to establish that:
(a) Any employee or employer, in negotiating for an employment con-
tract, may conduct the negotiations on his or her own behalf or may
choose to be represented by another person, group, or organisation.
(b) Appropriate arrangements to govern the employment relationship may
be provided by an individual employment contract or a collective em-
ployment contract, with the type of contract and the contents of the con-
tract being, in each case, a matter for negotiation."s
Nothing in the ECA requires the parties to negotiate,0 nor does Part II
give rise to any enforceable legitimate expectation of negotiation." How-
ever, any party to negotiations for an employment contract may determine
whether to be represented and, if so, who his or her representative will be.9'
Under section 12(1) all such representatives must establish their authority to
represent in any negotiations, whereupon section 12(2) states that:
[w]here any employee or employer has authorised a person, group, or or-
ganisation to represent the employee or employer in negotiations for an
employment contract, the employee or employer with whom the negotia-
tions are being undertaken shall... recognize the authority of that person,
group or organisation to represent the employee or employer in those ne-
gotiations.9-
There is no statutory definition of the concept of recognition and noth-
ing in the background material to the ECA to suggest what-if any-
substantial obligation was in the mind of the draftsperson at this point.94 In-
deed, in the original drafting instructions for the Employment Contracts Act,
the suggestion was made that the employee's choice of bargaining agent
should be subject to a right of veto on the employer's part, a suggestion ap-
parently amended on the basis of departmental advice that such a measure
would conflict with the "freedom of choice" purortedly conferred else-
where in Part II, with section 12(2) being the result.
Not surprisingly, both the Employment Court and the Court of Appeal
have had some difficulty in interpreting the intention of Parliament in terms
89. Employment Contracts Act § 9, 1991 (N.Z.).
90. This is a key aspect to the "permissive" bargaining regime under Part II of the ECA.
See, for example, observations in Hyndman v. Air New Zealand Ltd. [ 1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 820.
91. Id.
92. ECA § 10. This is subject to a rarely invoked exception allowing the other party to
object to representatives with serious criminal convictions. ECA § 11.
93. ECA § 12(2).
94. Although the concept of recognition is obviously a key aspect of good faith bar-
gaining regimes, which represent the antithesis of Part n of the ECA.
95. MAZANGARB'S EMPLOYMENT LAw, supra note 64, 1 12.9.
1997]
17
Hughes: The Employment Court, "Judicial Activism," and the Coalition Agre
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1997
184 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
of the obligation to recognize representatives. In Adams v. Alliance Textiles
(N.Z.) Ltd.,96 the Employment Court held that no implied rule of neutrality
results from the obligation to recognize representatives. The result was that,
where an employee had authorized a representative to act, the employer was
said to be entitled to attempt to negotiate directly with the employee.' On
appeal, in Eketone v. Alliance Textiles (N.Z.) Ltd.," President Cooke sug-
gested that--once a union had established its authority to represent certain
employees-"then the employer fails to recognize the authority of the union
if the employer attempts to negotiate directly with those employees" and
that "[to] go behind the union's back does not seem consistent with recog-
nizing its authority."99 Following Eketone, the Employment Court was held
to have erred in law when it extended the Eketone analysis to cover an em-
ployer's communication with employees concerning negotiations with their
union while those negotiations were in progress. In N.Z Medical Labora-
tory Workers Union Inc. v. Capital Coast Health Ltd.,' ° the Court of Appeal
agreed that once the negotiating process was underway between an em-
ployer and the authorized representative of employees, that actual process
may not be conducted with a person so represented. Nevertheless, the Court
then distinguished between negotiating (described as being "a process of
mutual discussion and bargaining") and the provision of factual informa-
tion:
The provision of factual information does not impinge on that process.
But anything that is intended or calculated to persuade or to threaten the
consequences of not yielding does. Whether any words or actions are of
that kind is a question of fact to be determined on an overall view of what
was said or done and the context in which it was said or done. 10 '
The extent of the employer's ability to provide information during ne-
gotiations without breaching section 12(2) is illustrated by the contempora-
neous decisions of the majority of the Full Court of Appeal in N.Z. Fire
Service Commission v. Ivamy'° and Airways Corporation of N.Z. Ltd. v.
NZALPA IUW (Inc.).1'0 In these cases, the Court held that there was no
96. [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 982.
97. Subject to constraints on harsh and oppressive behavior, undue influence, or duress,
each forbidden by section 57 of the ECA.
98. [1993] 2 E.R.N.Z. 783.
99. Id. at 787.
100. [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 93.
101. Id.
102. [1996] 1 E.R.N.Z. 85.
103. [1996] 1 E.R.N.Z. 126. For analysis of the two decisions from opposing perspec-
tives, see Maxine Gay, Back to Year Minus One, 1996 EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. 60; Gordon
Anderson, Collective Bargaining after Ivamy, 1996 EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. 80; Gordon An-
derson, Collective Bargaining and the Law: New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act Five
Years On [1996] AUSTL. J. LAB. L. 106; Sandra Moran, Ivamy and Airways-The Implica-
tions for Employees, NEw ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY EMPLOYMENT LAW CONFERENCE PAPERS
163 (1996) (all critical of the Court of Appeal's majority decision); Barbara Burton, Ivamy,
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breach of the duty to recognize where, respectively, the employer provided
material to employees setting out the employer's case and-in some cases-
draft contracts, prior to release of this information to their union, and pro-
vided "updates" on negotiations directly to employees coupled with the so-
licitation of feedback through accompanying "feedback forms." In both
cases, the Employment Court's decision that the conduct breached section
12 was overruled and in both cases there were strong dissenting judgments
in the Court of Appeal.'0
Ivamy encapsulates the difficulties in ascertaining Parliament's inten-
tion from the tersely worded and largely permissive provisions of Part II of
the ECA. While the majority saw its decision as conforming to that inten-
tion, the vigor of the dissenting judgments was unusual, Justice Thomas
going so far as to state that the majority decision was one which would
"effectively bring to an end the practice of collective bargaining for a col-
lective employment contract as recognised and defined by Parliament in the
Employment Contracts Act."' 5 The dissenting judges in Ivamy also ques-
tioned the legitimacy of the new-found readiness of the majority to disturb
the findings of the Employment Court on an appeal limited to points of law,
a point we shall return to presently.
What, then, of the argument raised by employer groups that the Em-
ployment Court has been unduly "activist" in its decisions under section 12?
First, it is clear that the decision to avoid detailed prescription in relation to
bargaining arrangements was-and remains-a calculated risk, with inevi-
table reliance on the courts to make sense of uncertain concepts:
Legislation that is unclear or fails to address issues arising in practice can
lead on a reliance on litigation to resolve issues. The effect may be costs
in terms of time and money to the parties and of Government. However,
detailed and/or prescriptive regulation does not necessarily produce either
clarity or certainty. Nor does regulation guarantee appropriate or better
outcomes. It can limit the ability of the parties to manage their own ar-
rangements successfully and to adapt and respond to a changing environ-
ment.1o
As the Minister of Finance recently pointed out, Section 12 is a section
... where a lot depends on one word - "recognize." And it has taken a
number of judgments of the Employment Court and the Full Court of Ap-
peal to bring some clarity to this area of law. A simple survey of the
or Balance Restored, 1996 EMPLOYMENT L. BuLL. 83; Derek Broadmore, Airways-The
Facts: Ivamy and Airways-The Implications for Employers, NEw ZEALAND LAW SocIETY
EMPLOYMENT LAW CONFERENCE PAPERS 169 (1996); Jack Hodder, A Background to Fire
Service v. Ivamy and Airways Corporation v. NZALPA, NEw ZEALAND LAW SOcIETY
EMPLOYMENT LAw CONFERENCE PAPERS 149 (1996) (all favoring the Court of Appeal's ma-
jority decision).
104. Lord Cooke dissented in both decisions. Justice Thomas dissented in Ivamy only.
105. [1996] 1 E.R.N.Z. 85, at 125.
106. Department of Labour, Post-Election Brief 34, Oct. 1996.
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leading cases shows that what counts as by-passing a bargaining agent is
still not entirely clear."7
Second, substantive content was first given to the duty to recognize by
the Court of Appeal in Eketone. Third, to the extent that the Employment
Court was subsequently overruled on appeal, the 3:2 majority in Ivamy, and
the strength of the dissenting judgments, indicates that the issue is by no
means clear cut. ' Fourth, the overruling of the Employment Court in Ivamy
and in Airways was, in the view of the dissenting judges and most com-
mentators,'09 an unorthodox extension of the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction,
derogating from the fundamental principle that findings of fact at first in-
stance are to be accepted on appeal unless they cannot reasonably be sup-
ported by the evidence.
As we have seen, the Coalition Agreement subsumes the issue of rec-
ognition under the heading of "fair bargaining." Indeed, to date, it is the
only aspect of that commitment to fairness, which is expressed to be limited
to describing areas "where compliance is necessary to abide by principles
underlying the Act." The remainder of the negotiating proposal from which
this paragraph was extracted contemplated the introduction of "fair" bar-
gaining in its more conventional form, with duties to meet, to consider
matters raised within a reasonable time frame, and to facilitate the conduct
of the bargaining process. The introduction of fair bargaining was con-
demned in the answer by the Public Service as moving the ECA "away from
one of its major underlying principles namely that the content of contracts
should be determined by the parties themselves" (even though the proposal
related to process rather than outcome) and as carrying significant risks for
employment and economic growth."0
Finally, and paradoxically, one of the principles underlying the ECA-
to be maintained in terms of the Coalition commitment to "fair bargain-
ing"-is the deliberate exclusion of principles of fairness when the courts
consider the parties' bargaining behavior. Section 57 sets the appropriate
standard as that of "harsh and oppressive" behavior, an intentionally high
threshold well above the normal standard of unfairness or unconscionability
which applies in all other contractual situations."' In answer to a question
from the negotiators during the coalition talks, the Public Service answered
that to change the relevant criterion under section 57 to that of unfairness
(i.e., to apply the standard contractual test) would have a number of adverse
consequences:
107. Birch, supra note 25.
108. See, in particular, Gordon Anderson articles, supra note 103.
109. See supra note 103.
110. RESPONSE TO REQUESTS, supra note 33, Request No. 519/2.
111. Adams v. Alliance Textiles (N.Z.) Ltd. [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 982; United Food etc.
IUW v. Talley [1992] 3 E.R.N.Z. 423. See Ellen Dannin, Bargaining under New Zealand's
Employment Contracts Act. The Problem of Coercion, 17 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 455 (1996).
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It is not possible to predict the precise nature and extent of intervention by
the courts but there is a risk that it will be difficult for the courts to de-
velop a consistent approach to the interpretation and application of the
proposed amendment given the wide variety of individual contractual
situations. In any event, it is likely that the proposed amendment would
have a highly detrimental impact on the efficient functioning of the labour
market, with flow on effects on employment. The proposal effectively
transfers the decision-making function from the parties to the Employ-
ment Court, which runs counter to the basic philosophy underpinning the
Employment Contracts Act.
12
Apart from the confusion once again between process and outcome il-
lustrated by the reference to "transfer of the decision-making function,"
tellingly, no reference was made in the answer to detailed published re-
search on the outcomes when courts apply the standard test for unfair con-
tractual behavior and, in particular, to research carried out by the New Zea-
land Law Commission only six years earlier."3
Personal Grievances and Procedural Fairness
The personal grievance provisions of Part III of the ECA, with a few
exceptions,"' re-enact the corresponding provisions of the repealed Labour
Relations Act 1987. Like the retention of the specialist Court, the transfer of
the grievance provisions was the outcome of a closely fought policy de-
bate. 5 Here at least the formal guidelines for establishing intention are
clear. Where new legislation re-enacts provisions drawn from earlier legis-
lation which it replaces, it is assumed that Parliament was aware of the way
in which the courts had interpreted those provisions and, by re-enacting
them unchanged, was endorsing that interpretation."6 The principles under-
lying the personal grievance jurisdiction were firmly established by the time
the ECA was enacted, having been in force in respect of the most significant
grievance-unjustifiable dismissal-since 1973. '7 Yet paradoxically, it is
those principles which have supplied the main focus of claimed judicial ac-
tivism on the part of the Employment Court under the ECA, particularly as
112. RESPONSETO REQUESTS, supra note 33, Request No. 519/5.
113. NEw ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, UNFAIR CONTRACTS (1991). Another recent New
Zealand treatment was supplied in MINDY CHEN-WISHART, UNCONSCIONABLE BARGAINS
(1989). For the background to ECA § 57, see MAZENGARB'S EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note
64, 57.2.
114. These exceptions are not relevant for present purposes.
115. See Walsh & Ryan, The Making of the Employment Contracts Act, supra note 45.
116. See JoHN BURROWS, STATUTE LAw IN NEW ZEALAND 170 (1992). For the problems
in the use of statutory interpretation techniques in this context, see Ellen Dannin, Consum-
mating Market-Based Labor Law Reform in New Zealand: Context and Reconfiguration 14
B.U. INT'L L.J., 267 (1996).
117. The concept of unjustifiable dismissal was introduced in the Industrial Relations
Act 1973. For the background, see JoHN HUGHES, PAUL ROTH, & GORDON ANDERSON,
PERSONALGRIEVANCES ch. 1 (1996).
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they relate to procedural fairness in dismissals and the expiry of fixed-term
contracts.
It has been argued, nevertheless, that the dramatic change in the bar-
gaining arrangements under the ECA should have been reflected in a
changed judicial approach to personal grievances. The Labour Relations Act
1987, according to this argument, was based on collective documents with
prescribed conditions, while the key feature of Part II of the ECA is the pur-
ported "freedom to choose" in relation to the form and content of employ-
ment contracts. As a consequence, it is argued, when considering grievances
under the ECA, a correspondingly greater weight should be placed on what
the parties have contracted for. This approach has been urged particularly
strongly in relation to grievances based on failure to observe procedural
fairness in redundancy cases and grievances based on the expiry of a fixed-
term contract." 8 However, it is suggested that this line of reasoning-as well
as giving insufficient effect to the established principles of statutory inter-
pretation relating to re-enacted provisions-overlooks a fundamental feature
of personal grievances under the Labour Relations Act 1987. Under that
Act, personal grievances were able to be brought by any employee who was
a union member,"9 whether he or she was covered by a collective or by an
individual contract. Many grievances brought under the Labour Relations
Act were brought by employees on individual contracts which had been ne-
gotiated under conditions emerging for the most part only from sketchy
common law principles,"O reflecting the "freedom of choice" environment
now established for all employees under Part II of the ECA."' While the
proportion of employees on individual contracts has grown dramatically un-
der the breakdown of collective bargaining precipitated by the ECA,' this
does not alter the point that the personal grievance procedure was designed
to include such employees under the Labour Relations Act 1987 and-
arguably-should not alter the approach of the courts to this area of the law
from that adopted under the 1987 Act.
The requirements of procedural fairness were well established by the
118. See supra note 46, and Campbell, supra note 44. The argument finds particular fa-
vor with the current President of the Court of Appeal, Sir Ivor Richardson, in the two key
decisions Brighouse Ltd. v. Bilderbeck [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 243 (in which he dissented) and
Principal of the Auckland College of Education v. Hagg, unreported, March 26, 1997, C.A.
230/96, in which he delivered the principal judgment. It is fair to add that proponents of this
line of argument would also probably have endorsed the same approach as being appropriate
under the Labour Relations Act 1987, with the changed nature of bargaining under the ECA
simply adding a further emphasis.
119. Labour Relations Act § 216(2), 1987 (N.Z.).
120. For contemporary accounts, see JOHN HUGHES, LABOUR LAW IN NEW ZEALAND, ch.
1 (1989), and ALEXANDER SZAKATS, AN INTRODUC-rON TO THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT Parts II
& 111 (1988).
121. See generally, MAZENGARB'S EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 64, for commentary
on Part H1 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, especially at paragraphs 18.2-18.4.
122. For summaries of the statistical surveys, see supra note 64, para 18.4.
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time the ECA was enacted." In cases of dismissal for cause, they include
such basic elements as a requirement that notice be given of the allegation
against the employee and of the likely consequences if the allegation is es-
tablished, a genuine opportunity for the employee to refute the allegation or
to explain or mitigate his or her behavior, and an unbiased consideration of
the employee's explanation. 1 4 A clause in the Employment Contracts Bill,
which was aimed at limiting (if not entirely excluding) the role of proce-
dural fairnessf was dropped, as-in the words of the Department of La-
bour at the time-"[t]he explicit overruling of these requirements.. . re-
moves what in effect are regarded, in New Zealand and internationally, as
basic employment rights."'2 Or, as Mr. Bradford (the current Minister of
Labour) stated in 1993, "The requirements of natural justice have become
firmly established as a benchmark for judicial decision making in all juris-
dictions."'2 In its place, new provisions were inserted that make it manda-
tory for the Tribunal or the Court to reduce remedies where the situation
giving rise to the dismissal was contributed to by fault on the employee's
part.
It is not surprising, then, that the Employment Court has continued to
apply the principles of procedural fairness, most of which derive from
judgments of the Court of Appeal (by which the Employment Court and its
predecessors are bound). Complaints of judicial activism in this respect are
puzzling when viewed objectively. Indeed, in some significant cases, the
Court of Appeal has remitted cases back to the specialist lower court on the
basis that the principles of natural justice may not have been sufficiently
applied by the court below. 9
The most controversial aspect of procedural fairness, the duty to con-
sider payment of compensation for redundancy to employees whose con-
tracts are silent on the issue, can be seen in this context. That duty was
123. See HUGHES, supra note 117, para. 4.170.
124. N.Z. Food Processing Union v. Unilever N.Z. Ltd. [1990] 1 N.Z.I.L.R. 35.
125. Employment Contracts Bill, Clause 17(3). For an analysis, see JOHN HUGHES, THE
ROLE OF LABOUR LAW: THE FUTURE OF INST1TUTIONS AND PERSONAL GRIEVANCES (Victoria
University of Wellington Industrial Relations Centre Working Paper 1/91, 1991).
126. DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR TO THE LABOUR
SELECT COMMITTEE 62 (1991).
127. Speaker, The Employment Contracts Act in Operation: A Government View,
Speech Notes to the Victoria University of Wellington Industrial Relations Centre Seminar
(May 15, 1992).
128. Employment Contracts Act §§ 40(2) & 41(3), 1991 (N.Z.). For a summary of the
relevant principles, see JOHN HUGHES ET AL., PERSONAL GRIEVANCES paras. [11.45] - [11.51]
(1996), and Sean Woodward, The Effect of Employee Conduct on Personal Grievance Reme-
dies, 20 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 385 (1995).
129. The most significant example is Auckland Shop Employees Union v. Woolworths
(N.Z) Ltd. [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 372.
130. See Raymond Harbridge & Peter Kiely, Redundancy: Trends in Compensation, 20
N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 302 (1995); Raymond Harbridge, When the Gun Goes Off-
Compensation for Redundancy, 1997 EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. 103; Virginia Dunlop, A Re-
sponse to "When the Gun Goes Off," 1997 EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. 143; and Lori Grantham,
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upheld by a majority of the Full Court of Appeal in Brighouse Ltd. v.
Bilderbeck,"' where Justice Casey recognized that the Court of Appeal's
approach could be seen as "a radical departure from the earlier decisions of
the specialist Courts."1 2 While criticized as being unduly activist both by
employer groups' and the current Minister of Labour, 34 the requirement
only operates so long as the employment contract neither provides for, nor
negates, redundancy compensation. A simple-and increasingly com-
mon"'35-- clause in the contract stating that no such compensation is payable
will operate to defeat it.
3 6
Two of the replies from the Public Service to questions from the coali-
tion negotiating teams addressed the issue of procedural fairness directly.37
In the same way as the Department of Labour's Ministerial Brief, 8 both as-
sumed that there are valid concerns about the role of procedural fairness,
said to result from a high degree of uncertainty about the outcomes of per-
sonal grievance cases, and both assumed that change is desirable.' 39 In re-
sponse to the question, "Are there any changes to the ECA that would help
to increase sustainable rates of economic growth and/or improve labour
market performance?" the Public Service raised changes to the role of pro-
cedural fairness:
First, addressing the uncertainty that has arisen around personal griev-
ances ... will reduce the focus on procedural issues, about which there is
the greatest uncertainty. It should be noted that the difficulty of codifying
a simple process which reduced the need for future legal debate should not
be underestimated. Second, the emphasis that the courts attach to proce-
dural issues could be altered through a legislative amendment which
sought to give some guidance on the weight they should give to proce-
dural issues relative to substantive issues. An indication from Parliament
could help to redress, although not eliminate, current concerns. Such an
amendment would, however, raise some legal issues, as under current law
there is no clear distinction between substantive and procedural issues.
Third, changes to the structure of remedies for personal grievances could
increase the emphasis that is placed on substantive matters. Remedies
could be made to relate more closely to the behavior of employees. At
present remedies for an unjustified dismissal may not be reduced where
the employee does not contribute to any procedural failing.., leading to
Towards a Right to Redundancy Compensation, 21 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 157 (1996).
131. [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 243.
132. Id. at 257.
133. See, in particular, Colin Howard, supra note 48.
134. Campbell, supra note 44.
135. This was made clear in the judgment of President Cooke in Brighouse Ltd. v.
Bilderbeck [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 243. For the use of such clauses, see Harbridge & Kiely, supra
note 130.
136. Campbell, supra note 44 (quoting-Peter Kiely) (meeting the criticism of the Brig-
house decision from the standpoint of a lawyer who usually acts for employers).
137. RESPONSE TO REQUEST, supra note 33, Request Nos. 508/3, 508/5.
138. "No Agenda" says the Labour Department, supra note 34, at 38.
139. RESPONSETO REQUEST, supra note 33, Request No. 508/5.
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the determination of unjustifiability, even if they have contributed to the
reason for the dismissal. The law could be clarified so that the remedies
would be reduced where the employee contributes to any of the circum-
stances of the dismissal.' °
This analysis is infected by a crucial internal inconsistency, whereby
the authors accept the (legally correct) view that procedural fairness and
substantive fairness cannot be separated,'' while simultaneously suggesting
that amendments might "redress" the uncertainties caused by procedural
fairness as a discrete issue.
When the Public Service was asked, "What are the implications of
codifying the existing case law relating to personal grievances and proce-
dural issues within the Employment Contracts Act to ensure that all em-
ployees and employers have a central legislative reference that outlines their
rights and responsibilities?"1 42 the answer was not confined to the ques-
tion.'43 The advantages and disadvantages of codification were discussed in
the abstract (although, surprisingly perhaps, no mention was made of corre-
sponding provisions that might have been thought to be directly relevant,
such as the well-established use of codification of procedural fairness in
other jurisdictions (notably the UK),' " and of analogous codification in
other areas of employment law in New Zealand).14 1 The question was used
as a springboard, however, to reiterate employers' criticisms of the personal
grievance procedure and of the Court, and to raise alternative approaches
such as enabling employers to contract out of the grievance procedure or
abolishing the grievance procedure and leaving employees with the common
law and "general legislation" such as the Human Rights Act 1993 and the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 as an option.'
4 6
In key areas, the ensuing analysis of alternative approaches was lacking
in rigor and-to a legally untrained eye-might have made these ap-
proaches seem to provide more protection than is in fact the case. For ex-
ample, the Public Service Reply nowhere mentioned the fact that the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act does not apply to private contractual arrange-
140. Id.
141. A fundamental point, reiterated by the Court of Appeal in Nelson Air Ltd v. New
Zealand Airline Pilots Assn. Inc. [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 665 and Brighouse Ltd. v. Bilderbeck
[1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 243.
142. RESPONSETO REQUEST, supra note 33, Request No. 508/3.
143. For a summary of the document, see generally Rebecca Macfie, Labour Depart-
ment Officials Push Limits of EC Act, 1997 EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. 31, 32.
144. ADVISORY CONCILATION AND ARBITRATION SERVICE, DISCIPLINARY PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURES IN EMPLOYMENT (1977).
145. For example, there are a number of analogous codes of practice for employers is-
sued under the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992.
146. It is at this point, in particular, that the arguable need for strict impartiality in the
provision of information (see supra note 37) might be seen to have been departed from. Sug-
gested alternatives, such as the introduction of a right to "contract out" of the grievance pro-
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ments,"7 and, while reciting employers' criticisms of excessive legalism and
delay under the personal grievance jurisdiction, made no reference to corre-
sponding concerns about the common law from the employee's point of
view when setting out an analysis of wrongful dismissal at common law as
an alternative to the grievance procedure.'" Nor did the analysis make any
structured reference to the link between liberalization of the common law
rules in New Zealand as a consequence of the availability of the grievance
procedure (in other words, the courts' tendency to see the statutory frame-
work of the grievance procedure as an indication that the common law rules
should-at least to some degree-become less restrictive so as to reflect
contemporary standards in areas such as procedural fairness). The Court of
Appeal has repeatedly made this connection.' Should the grievance proce-
dure be removed, the obvious resulting question is whether the common law
courts would take this as an indication that a correspondingly greater degree
of conservatism is required in the common law jurisdiction.
Personal Grievances and Fixed-Term Contracts
The third example of purported judicial activism under the ECA has
been the Employment Court's approach to fixed-term contracts. In New
Zealand such contracts are commonly fixed in relation to a date of termina-
tion, but sometimes have a term which is referable to the length of a season
(e.g., fruit picking, fishing, etc.) or to the completion of a particular project.
The personal grievance procedure relating to unjustifiable dismissal
under the ECA makes no separate provision for fixed-term contracts. Under
the corresponding provisions in the Industrial Relations Act 1973, the Court
of Appeal in Actors Equity v. Auckland Theatre Trust had rejected-by a
majority-an approach favored by President Cooke under which dismissal
was to be given a wide meaning, corresponding to its literal one of sending
away. 5" Instead, the majority (Justices McMullin and Barker) held that fail-
ure to renew a fixed-term contract might form the basis for a claim of un-
justifiable dismissal if there had been an express or implied promise or re-
newal, or a legitimate expectation to this effect had been created. Given the
potential for the use of fixed-term contracts to circumvent the protection
provided by the grievance procedure, under the subsequent Labour Rela-
tions Act 1987, the Labour Court-while retaining the Actors Equity test-
then developed a series of additional guidelines to be applied to the termi-
nation of fixed-term contracts to determine whether an employer which al-
lowed the term to expire was thereby effectively dismissing the employee,
relying in part on Article 3 of ILO Convention 158 (which requires safe-
147. See, e.g., McGuinn v. The Board of Trustees of Palmerston North Boys' High
School, CP 36/95, High Court, Palmerston North (Dec. 24, 1996).
148. RFSPONSE TO REQUESTS, supra note 33, Appendix Ito Request 508/3.
149. Most clearly in Ogilvy & Mather (N.Z) Ltd. v. Turner [1993] 2 E.R.N.Z. 799.
150. [1989] 2 N.Z.L.R. 154.
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guards to be observed so that the use of fixed terms does not undermine the
general protection against unfair dismissal). 5 ' A key element in these
guidelines was an emphasis on whether the fixed term was genuine in na-
ture, with reference to the employer's operational needs.'
In decisions of the Employment Court under the ECA, the guidelines
developed under the Labour Relations Act 1987 were held to be still appli-
cable, for reasons which will be elaborated below.'53 However, in its recent
decision in The Principal of the Auckland College of Education v. Hagg,5"4
on appeal from a decision in which the Employment Court had referred to
(but not directly applied) those guidelines, the Court of Appeal suggested
obiter, but in a firm and unqualified way, that the guidelines had no legal
basis.'55 Rather, the Court suggested, the expiry of a fixed-term contract will
constitute a dismissal only if the contract has been varied in the way con-
templated by the Actors Equity judgment or, alternatively, was a "sham"
under which the parties had a common intention to create rights and obliga-
tions which did not reflect the form of the contract (that is, not a fixed-term
contract at all). In a joint judgment, delivered by President Richardson, four
judges of the Full Court of the Court of Appeal accepted that fixed terms
might be used unfairly to defeat the protections given by the personal griev-
ance procedure (using the example of a series of "nominally" fixed-term
monthly contracts for the whole workforce). However, the judges stated that
it was not for the courts to alter the meaning of the word "dismissal." That
was for Parliament. Such devices, it seems, will now probably succeed. Jus-
tice Thomas, in a separate judgment, suggested that it could not have been
Parliament's intention to allow the personal grievance procedure to be so
easily circumvented and suggested that a "shift in the nature" of a short-
term contract might arise if it is "rolled over" to such an extent that it can no
longer be said that the true relationship between the parties is anything other
than ongoing employment.5 6 This difference between the judges in the
Court of Appeal essentially concerned the "genuineness" of any given fixed
term, the consideration at the heart of the Employment Court's guidelines.
Immediately following the Hagg decision, Max Bradford, the Minister
151. N.Z. Food Processing Union v. I.C.I. N.Z. Ltd. [1989] 3 N.Z.I.L.R. 24.
152. The guidelines also asked whether the contract had been allowed to expire out of
some wrong motive or unfairness, which seemed to be relevant more to the issue of justifica-
tion than that of dismissal (although derived from the judgment of Justice McMullin in Ac-
tors Equity, supra note 150, at 142).
153. Smith v. Radio Ltd. [1995] 1 E.R.N.Z. 281; Haddon v. Victoria Univ. of Welling-
ton [1995] 1 E.R.N.Z. 375.
154. [1997] 1 E.R.N.Z. 116.
155. The case was decided on a more narrow ground, with reference to the specific leg-
islative context in the state sector. See Bernard Banks, Hagg-The Public Sector Implica-
tions, 1997 EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. 43; and John Hughes, Fixed-Term Contracts in the Pri-
vate Sector After Hagg- 1997 EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. 46.
156. It will be recalled that Justice Thomas also delivered a powerful dissent in the key
decision in Ivamy, supra note 102.
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of Labour, stated that "[i]f there was ever an example of what the Coalition
Agreement refers to as judicial activism in the employment area, [the Em-
ployment Court's decision in] Hagg is it."' 57 This statement is difficult to
reconcile with the treatment of the issue during both the passage of the Em-
ployment Contracts Bill and in subsequent developments. During the pas-
sage of the Bill, the New Zealand Employers' Federation and the New Zea-
land Business Roundtable made vigorous submissions demanding a
statutory reversal of the effect of the Labour Court's guidelines on fixed-
term contracts (which were identical to those in issue in Hagg). In response,
Mr. Bradford (who was then the chairperson of the Labour Select Commit-
tee) asked for-and received-briefing notes on the issue from the Depart-
ment of Labour.'-" These notes set out the then-existing law in terms of the
guidelines.9 The Department of Labour's Report to the Labour Select
Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill again advised against chang-
ing the guidelines applicable to fixed-term contracts, drawing attention to its
earlier briefing notes. 6° The personal grievance provisions were subse-
quently re-enacted without any change in this respect. Both the political re-
sponse to the issue and the established principles of statutory interpretation,
under which re-enactment of provisions without change is generally seen to
endorse the approach taken by the courts to the corresponding provisions in
superseded legislation,16 might well be thought to indicate that Parliament
both understood, and intended, that the developed guidelines in relation to
fixed-term contracts would continue to apply. The approach of the Govern-
ment after the enactment of the ECA also supports this construction. When
the Government reported to the International Labour Organisation under
ILO Convention No. 158, it set out New Zealand's approach to fixed-term
contracts in terms of the guidelines and attached no reservations to the
analysis.'62 No reference to this background was made by the Court of Ap-
peal in Hagg, although, as we have seen, Justice Thomas alone questioned
whether Parliament could have intended that the intention of Parliament
could be defeated by contracts which were fixed by time in form only.
Ironically, in the light of the Minister's statement, the answers from the
Public Service during the coalition negotiations also reflect an unqualified
157. Minister of Labour Max Bradford, Address to the 1997 Government to Business
Summit (Apr. 3, 1997).
158. Department of Labour, Briefing Notes to the Labour Select Committee, Fixed Tenn
Contracts (Mar. 1991).
159. This undated Report followed the conventional format whereby the Department
with primary responsibility for the bill summarizes submissions on the draft legislation, sug-
gests amendments, and explains why other amendments sought are not reflected in the draft
before the committee (unpublished report, on file with author).
160. Id. at 61.
161. See JoHNBuRRows, STATUTE LAw INNEw ZEALAND 170 (1992).
162. Report of the New Zealand Government Report, Termination of Employment Con-
vention, 1982 (No. 158) for the period ending June 30, 1994, Commentary to Article 3.
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use of the guidelines. 6
3. The Possible Outcomes
As of July 1997, it is not possible to predict the outcome so far as the
future of the Employment Court, or of the areas of law touched upon earlier,
are concerned. Arguably, the policy choices in relation to the specialist in-
stitutions remain broadly the same as those in 1991,' 6' namely, retention of
the specialist institutions in their present form, abolition of the Employment
Court but retention of the Employment Tribunal with appellate rights to the
High Court, or removal of provision for any specialist institutions so that all
employment matters would be dealt with by the ordinary courts or the Dis-
putes Tribunal.'6 As the Department of Labour reported to its incoming
Minister in 1996, it was considered in 1991 "after considerable debate" that
the specialist institutions would best support the objectives of the ECA. The
Department at that stage went on to state that
Itlhe key issue in relation to the Tribunal and the Court is whether spe-
cialist institutions continue to be the best way to achieve these goals and
163. One question asked:
What are the implications of amending the Employment Contracts Act to in-
clude within the term 'unjustifiably dismissed' the situation where an individ-
ual fixed-term contract is terminated in circumstances where the same position
continues in existence after the expiry date contained in any contract of em-
ployment, unless the employer has provided the employee with reasonable
notice that the contract was not going to be extended and has commercial or
operational reasons for so deciding?
RESPONSE TO REQUESTS, supra note 33, Request No. 519/4. After setting forth the guidelines,
the Public Service comment was that the intention was to reinforce the case law:
It should be noted that it would codify only part of existing case law, as well
as introducing a new element through its requirement for reasonable notice of
the termination of the contract. There is a serious risk that legislative amend-
ment might be interpreted by the courts as signalling substantive changes to
the law, beyond current case law. It is questionable whether the benefits of an
amendment of this type would outweigh the potential costs in terms of unpre-
dictable development by the courts.
The current legal position relating to fixed term contracts has been developed
in a series of cases originating before the introduction of the Employment
Contracts Act, and may well be developed by future decisions. It was noted
that, at the time, the Hagg appeal was pending. Any legislative amendment of
this nature is likely to change the basis for the development of the law re-
garding fixed term contracts in an unpredictable way and may lead to unin-
tended consequences.
Id. The answer concluded that it was necessary to consider carefully whether an amendment
to the Employment Contracts Act relating to fixed-term contracts was necessary.
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support the objectives of the framework legislation. In this context it is
important to identify whether issues arise:
" from institutional arrangements,
" from lack of clarity in policy, or
* from policy not being sufficiently specified in legislation.'"
Concern about decisions by the Employment Court and the Court of Ap-
peal on redundancy compensation and employers' obligations to follow
fair procedures when dismissing employees, for example, may be more
effectively addressed by legislative amendment than changing institu-
tional structures.' 7
Nevertheless, the climate of opinion in policy-making circles-
particularly within some circles in the Department of Labour itself-has
changed markedly in the past six years. One request for information during
the coalition negotiations was whether there were any changes to the ECA
that would help to increase sustainable rates of economic growth and/or im-
prove labor market performance.'6 In this context, the Public Service noted
as areas where change could improve performance in both respects
"personal grievances, legal institutions, and the treatment of minimum con-
ditions in general."'' 69 Concerns about the Employment Tribunal were raised
in a limited way, in the context of ease and cost of access, perhaps reflecting
a commonly held perception that the Tribunal is less activist than the Court
(itself to some extent a concomitant of the exclusion of the Tribunal from
direct enforcement of the more heavily politicized aspects of the ECA, those
provisions relating to freedom of association and strikes and lockouts). 70 In
contrast, the Public Service answer went on to state the following:
The greatest concerns about the operation of the employment law institu-
tions relate to the Employment Court. Concerns expressed about the Court
have tended to focus on apparent inconsistencies between judicial deci-
sions and the intent of the statute, giving rise to uncertainty and confusion.
There are a number of ways that may, in principle, address this issue.
These range from ways of selecting judges, to changing the rights for ap-
peal within the current framework, to various degrees of integration of the
Employment Court into courts of general jurisdiction:
* Widening the pool of judicial talent from which judges hearing em-
ployment contract litigation are chosen;
* Rotating judges between the divisions of a general court could recog-
nize the build-up of specialist knowledge, but also broaden the
knowledge and experience in related areas of law;
... internal forms of quality control on judicial decision-making;
* Widening the scope for appeal from the Employment Court, such as
166. DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, POST-ELECTION BRIEF 38 (Oct. 1996).
167. Id.
168. RESPONSE TO REQUESTS, supra note 33, Request No. 508/5.
169. Id.
170. See section 56 of the ECA, under which the Court alone has jurisdiction to issue
compliance orders in relation to those Parts of the ECA.
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aligning it to appeal rights from the High Court, should place in-
creased disciplines on decision-making in the Employment Court;
parties could be given the option of choosing dispute resolution in the
general courts, with the legislation specifying the Employment Court
as the default option. This would work only if the Employment Court
and the High Court were given the same jurisdiction on employment
matters;
The functions of the Emloyment Court could be transferred to courts
of general jurisdiction."r
The analysis is noteworthy for its implicit acceptance of the idea that
the Employment Court's role is indeed a cause for concern, for its failure to
identify that the "concerns" which it listed all originate from employer pres-
sure groups, for the omission of countervailing views from unions and other
worker organizations, and for the radical nature of its chosen options-
changing the selection process for the judges (impliedly allowing for ap-
pointments based at least in part on political considerations, hitherto re-
garded as anathema to the system of judicial appointment in New Zea-
land), subjecting Employment Court judges to forms of quality control not
imposed on other judges, allowing parties to avoid the Court by "contracting
out," or simply abolishing the Court altogether.
As we have seen, the Coalition Agreement promises a review of deci-
sions of the Employment Court, which is to retain its jurisdiction "in [the]
meantime." The Government's likely final position on the matter cannot be
predicted with confidence. The Minister of Labour, Mr. Bradford, has de-
nied-albeit obliquely-that it is his intention to abolish the Court,' 73 while
emphasizing that the proposed review "should reveal whether the landscape
of the labour market has changed in a way that supports another look at the
institutional arrangements in force at the moment.', 174 Meanwhile, the Min-
ister of Finance, Bill Birch, has recently stated that "[t]he time may have
come to consider whether the industrial relations environment has changed
since 1991, so that the Employment Court need no longer be separate."' 7 As
we have seen, it is equally uncertain whether the insecure status of the Em-
ployment Court extends as well to the Employment Tribunal, or whether
one policy option which might be adopted is retention of the Tribunal (albeit
under a more limited jurisdiction, particularly in relation to personal griev-
171. RESPONSETO REQUESTS, supra note 33, Request No. 508/5, 6.
172. Wendy Davis, Judges and the Politics of Employment Law (1994) (unpublished
L.L.M. Research Paper 19, Victoria University of Wellington) (on file with Victoria Univer-
sity of Wellington Law Library) (quoting Sir Thomas Eichelbaum, Political Influences in the
Legal Profession: Judicial Independence-Fact or Fiction?, 2 N.Z. LAW CONFERENCE
PAPERS 120 (N.Z. Law Society, Mar. 1993)).
173. Campbell, supra note 44.
174. Max Bradford, What Happens Now?, Ministerial Address to the Seminar on La-
bour-Management-Government Relations in an Era of MMP, Industrial Relations Centre,
Victoria University of Wellington (Mar. 20, 1997).
175. W.F. ("Bill") Birch, Speech to the Wellington District Law Society (June 7, 1997).
Mr. Birch was Minister of Labour during the passage of the Employment Contracts Bill.
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ances), with the replacement of appeals to the Employment Court with ap-
peals to the ordinary courts (or, perhaps, to an "Employment Division" of
the District Court or of the High Court).176 Nor is it clear whether the Na-
tional Party's coalition partner, New Zealand First, has any independently
developed policy thinking on these issues. Nevertheless, the mechanisms
and consultation procedures for coalition management which are in place
and designed to ensure that important policy announcements are the subject
of prior consultation would seem to suggest that the coalition partners must
have been consulted on Mr. Birch's statements as well as those of Mr. Brad-
ford. 77
Under a new proportional representation system which was designed to
introduce greater accountability into the parliamentary system, the current
debate raises a number of ironies. Not the least of these is that the concept
of a specialist court, which had survived attacks on its exclusive jurisdiction
during a period when the National Government had an unassailable majority
and when the force of neo-classical economic thinking was thought to be at
its political zenith in New Zealand, is now apparently to be challenged by a
Government with a much smaller majority. That Government, moreover, is
composed of two parties, both of which had disclaimed any such intention
prior to the election, and one of which had made a political virtue of its in-
tention to make the ECA "fairer" and its institutions more accessible to em-
ployees. 78
176. While Minister with responsibility for New Zealand's "no fault' accident compen-
sation scheme, Mr. Birch replaced appeals to a specialist Accident Compensation Appeal
Authority with appeals to the District Court on the basis, among other things, that more
"robust" and less activist decisions would be delivered in this area under the Accident Reha-
bilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992. The experiment is widely regarded as a
failure and in some respects has led to lengthy delays. See THE LAW OF TORTS IN NEW
ZEALAND ch. 1 (Stephen Todd ed., 2d ed. 1997).
177. The communications would have been through a Parliamentary Coalition Manage-
ment Committee and Government Communications Committee. lain Templeton, Focus,
SUNDAY STAR TIMES, June 8, 1997, at C2.
178. POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 4.
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